Since the first satellite was launched into orbit in 1957, space technologies have continually developed, many of which exceed the capabilities envisioned at the beginning of the space age. Similarly, the number of space actors, both government and private, has increased in recent years. The rise of new technologies and actors has sparked debates about existing norms in space, particularly regarding weaponization, and how nations view national security and foreign policy objectives in space.
“Soft-kill” disablement technology could be deployed on missiles and ground or space assets.
China is an interesting player in this regard. Beijing’s space program has grown rapidly since it launched its first satellite in 1970. China’s space capabilities have progressed consistently, from sending a single man into space in 2003 to launching the first prototype of a space station eight years later, with plans to have a fully functional space station in orbit by 2023. China’s Long March rocket series includes one capable of launching up to 25 tonnes of payload into low Earth orbit, and it recently opened a new launch site on the southern island of Hainan. China has blueprints for exploration missions to the Moon and Mars, and is involved in a range of collaborative scientific experiments. These include the Moczi, named after an ancient Chinese scientist and philosopher, a quantum communications satellite developed in collaboration with Austrian scholars, and genetics experiments currently underway on the International Space Station (ISS).
China has stated that its space presence is part of its long-term strategic goal of becoming a space power, as highlighted in its Space White Paper released in December 2016.[to] “Making China a space power is a dream we are constantly pursuing.” While much of China’s space program remains opaque, some of the new technologies China has developed have the potential for dual-use capabilities. Previous concerns about China’s militarization of space were a result of its kinetic capabilities, as demonstrated in the response to the 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, in which China launched a ballistic missile to an altitude of more than 850 kilometers, destroying a mothballed weather satellite and creating hundreds of additional pieces of orbital debris in the process. Notable concerns, however, arise from new developments in the threat landscape, particularly the increasing and diversifying development of non-kinetic technologies.
In terms of weapons, kinetic energy technologies, whether ASAT weapons or tungsten rods (sometimes called “god rods” due to their destructive power), have long been a concern for potential conflicts in space. However, advances in non-kinetic energy technologies could provide equal or even greater benefits to militaries through support for operations in other domains using satellite applications, including Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and position, navigation, and timing, as well as improved imaging technology and resolution. Non-kinetic energy technologies can disrupt enemy operations or deny access to enemy space-based assets and downstream information. They are also likely to be adopted by actors such as Russia and China as a hybrid warfare strategy in space to stay below the threshold that would trigger U.S. retaliatory action.
The hypothetical scenario makes it clear that a modern regulatory framework for activities in space is needed.
Directed energy weapons are a variety of non-kinetic technologies that merit a closer look. Reports have emerged that China has developed high-powered lasers that could be used to “blind” U.S. spy satellites by interfering with their electro-optical and radar components, effectively disabling the satellites over Chinese territory and other strategic areas. Such lasers would be powerful enough to be fired from Earth, but could potentially be mounted on satellites in the future. Similarly, there are reports of ongoing development of high-powered microwave and radio frequency weapons that can disrupt electronic devices and jam communication systems. Such weapons would be capable of disabling enemy intelligence, communications, and navigation satellites, crippling their ability to conduct military operations. All of these are “soft kill” disabling technologies that could be deployed on missiles or ground- or space-based assets, furthering China’s ambitions to improve and defend its own C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities while degrading those of other nations. We also need to consider the possibility of intercepting satellites via open microwave antennas and gaining access not only to information, including imagery, but also to seize command and control.
Co-orbital systems (consisting of two or more satellites orbiting the same distance from Earth) pose a possible risk of dual use if they are pre-positioned, equipped with maneuvering capabilities, and capable of neutralizing other satellite systems. In July 2013, China launched a rocket carrying three satellites, one of which is believed to be equipped with a robotic arm that could grab another satellite and change its orbit, either to burn up in the atmosphere or to move it to a location where it would no longer be able to fulfill its mission. Such a system would have the advantage that it would be less likely to lead to conflict escalation or debris generation if used in less favorable circumstances, since it could pass for a dual-use vehicle whose publicly stated purpose is debris collection. Similar technologies are being developed by organizations seeking ways to repair satellites in orbit (known as on-orbit or on-orbit servicing), and of course a satellite with maneuvering capabilities could be used to damage or displace another satellite simply by colliding with it.
The benefits of a satellite equipped with a grappling arm to remove space debris are unquestionable, but only if China is perceived to be acting as a responsible world power. However, it is easy to imagine such a capability being used to remove enemy space assets in times of tension or conflict, as was the case when China seized a U.S. underwater drone in the South China Sea to “prevent the device from harming the safety of navigation and the crews of passing vessels.” If such an event were to occur in space, questions regarding attribution and intent would certainly arise. From these hypothetical scenarios, it is clear that a modern regulatory framework for actions in space is needed to mitigate both the militarization of space and the destabilization of the C4ISR capabilities of nations on Earth.
Finally, cybersecurity of space assets is also an issue of concern, with attribution issues playing a key role here as well. In November 2014, hackers suspected to have links to China temporarily took down a US weather satellite network. This followed cyberattacks against US satellites in 2007 and 2008, in which China was considered the prime suspect. Satellites are increasingly vulnerable to such attacks, especially as the Internet of Things becomes more widespread, with everyday objects being connected to the Internet. As the number of satellites in orbit increases,
As megaconstellations – systems consisting of hundreds of small satellites – become more widespread, the number of potential targets for malicious cyber attacks will increase.
New technological advances in non-kinetic energy technologies used for offensive purposes may call into question the relevance of the Outer Space Treaty.
Developments in non-kinetic space technologies are redefining space weaponization and shifting the balance of power in space. Advances in this area by countries such as China therefore have new strategic implications. Ultimately, these advances are not inherently malicious, but their potential for dual use will have three overarching effects:
First, China is establishing itself as a global leader not only in space but also in science and technology more broadly. These advances will help raise China’s profile in both areas as a potential partner for countries and organizations looking to enter or expand space activities. China may become an attractive partner for these countries, especially as the United States reconsiders its priorities regarding space exploration. Moreover, given the uncertain future of the ISS, China’s future space station may be the only viable alternative.
While scientific and technological development should be supported, its potential dual uses in both defense and security cannot be ignored. For example, the Moczi satellite is testing the use of quantum key distribution, a communication method that uses a phenomenon called quantum entanglement to send messages between two photons. The experiment conducted by the Moczi satellite achieved this over the longest distance ever attempted with this method. Potential applications include a global quantum internet. Quantum key distribution could also be used to create an unhackable communication system. While a fully functional system may still be some way off, it would give the Chinese military a distinct advantage if it could access such a system before other countries.
Second, new technological advances in non-kinetic technologies used for offensive purposes call into question the validity of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and similar international agreements and norms. The Outer Space Treaty, like its prohibition on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space, emphasizes that space should be thought of as a global commons to be used for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all peoples. This is intended to limit national sovereignty in space more than the WMD prohibition. Non-kinetic technologies, when used in a military context, can therefore be seen as potentially contradictory to these two distinct parts of the OST. The difficulty is that much of this technology can also be used for peaceful purposes in a way that respects the concept of the global commons, making it difficult to assess, monitor, and respond to the relative ambiguity of “offensive vs. defensive” uses of non-kinetic technologies in the space domain.
Moreover, the blurred line between weaponization and militarization of space presents significant definitional challenges in classifying relevant space technologies. When the OST was first drafted in 1967, nations’ primary concern was the possibility of nuclear proliferation in space, as other forms of space weapons and ways for militaries to use space to support their operations had not yet been developed. There is no doubt that space is being militarized, even though there are very few actual “weapons” in the traditional sense of ballistic or kinetic weapons. The famous adage “anything in space can be a weapon” rings even more true today.
The blurry line between weaponization and militarization of space poses significant definitional challenges in classifying space technologies.
Finally, if used offensively, these advances, whether GNSS or C4ISR superiority, could impact China’s defensive capabilities on Earth and provide a significant strategic advantage over enemy ground- and space-based assets in times of tension or conflict. While the international community looks to the globe for signs of great power competition from China’s rise, it would be wise to look to the heavens.
Alexandra Stickings
Alexandra is a Research Analyst at RUSI focusing on space policy and security.
Wer Nouwens
Vale is a Research Fellow in Asian Studies at RUSI, specialising in Chinese foreign policy and geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region.
